<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"><channel><title>ESC8 on IamWin's Blog</title><link>https://blog.iamwin.xyz/tags/esc8/</link><description>Recent content in ESC8 on IamWin's Blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 01:08:00 -0500</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://blog.iamwin.xyz/tags/esc8/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Active Directory Certificate Services: Abusing ADCS ESC8 (Kerberos Relay)</title><link>https://blog.iamwin.xyz/posts/esc8_krb/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 01:08:00 -0500</pubDate><guid>https://blog.iamwin.xyz/posts/esc8_krb/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="summary"&gt;Summary&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;ESC8&lt;/strong&gt; is an AD CS vulnerability where the Certificate Enrollment Web Service is enabled over &lt;strong&gt;HTTP&lt;/strong&gt; (without HTTPS). This allows intercepting a Domain Controller&amp;rsquo;s authentication and relaying it to the CA to request a certificate. With that certificate we can impersonate the DC, perform DCSync, and take full control of the domain.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="requirements"&gt;Requirements&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Valid domain user credentials (&lt;code&gt;Rosie.Powell:Cicada123&lt;/code&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The CA has Web Enrollment over HTTP enabled&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;NTLM disabled in the domain (authentication must use Kerberos)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Machine Account Quota &amp;gt; 0 (allows adding DNS records, default is 10)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="step-by-step-walkthrough"&gt;Step-by-step Walkthrough&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h3 id="1-initial-setup"&gt;1. Initial Setup&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ensure correct DNS resolution in &lt;code&gt;/etc/hosts&lt;/code&gt;:&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Active Directory Certificate Services: Abusing ADCS ESC8 (NTLM Relay)</title><link>https://blog.iamwin.xyz/posts/esc8/</link><pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:00:00 -0500</pubDate><guid>https://blog.iamwin.xyz/posts/esc8/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="introduction"&gt;Introduction&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;ESC8&lt;/strong&gt; is a vulnerability in &lt;strong&gt;Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS)&lt;/strong&gt; that occurs when the &lt;strong&gt;Web Enrollment&lt;/strong&gt; service is enabled over HTTP without encryption, or over HTTPS without &lt;strong&gt;Channel Binding (EPA)&lt;/strong&gt; enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable endpoint is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;pre tabindex="0"&gt;&lt;code&gt;http://&amp;lt;CA&amp;gt;/certsrv/certfnsh.asp
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;p&gt;This endpoint accepts &lt;strong&gt;NTLM authentication without signing or channel binding&lt;/strong&gt;, making it susceptible to &lt;strong&gt;NTLM Relay&lt;/strong&gt; attacks. In essence, an attacker can intercept the NTLM authentication of a privileged account (such as the Domain Controller&amp;rsquo;s machine account) and relay it to the ADCS service to obtain a valid certificate on behalf of that account.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>